Abstract: Major-General Sir Samuel Benfi eld Steele, the iconic Western Canadian police offi cer famed for helping to tame the West and the rowdy miners of the Yukon, was also a senior military commander in the chao c administra on of the Canadian Expedi onary Force in England in the First World War. Called the "Lion of the Fron er," by one biographer, Steele was less successful in his First World War command than popular narra ves of his life have portrayed. This ar cle demonstrates how he fl oundered under the strains of total war. In the Yukon, Steele's natural decisiveness and independence received free rein, where he did not have to defer and get approval from mul ple authori es for decisions, and where the scale of his responsibility was such that he could directly interact with all involved. In those condi ons, Steele thrived. He was a leader made by the fron er and performed best in that environment. In England, now in the centre and far from the fron er, the a ributes, character, and experience that served him so well did not translate. Steele was not the primary culprit or cause of the chaos in the administra on in England, but neither was he blameless or innocent of contribu ng to it. In eff ect, the Lion of the Fron er became the Lion in Winter. This ar cle is part of a special collec on of papers originally presented at a conference on "The North and the First World War," held May 2016 in Whitehorse, Yukon. 
Major-General Sir Samuel Benfi eld Steele, KCMG, CB, MVO, the iconic Western Canadian police offi cer famed for helping to tame the West and the rowdy miners of the Yukon, was also a senior military commander in the chaotic administration of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in England in the First World War. Steele, whom one biographer called the "Lion of the Frontier," commanded the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) in the Yukon and British Columbia at the height of the Klondike Gold Rush and was the embodiment of vigorous Canadian, Victorian-era masculinity. 3 He won further renown for commanding Lord Strathcona's Horse in the Second Anglo-Boer War, and as a division commander in the South African Constabulary. During the First World War, Steele was the General Offi cer Commanding (GOC) Canadians, as well as the British area command that included the main Canadian training base at Shorncliff e, England. But he was less successful in this command than popular narratives of his life have portrayed. He was one of six competing Canadian authorities in the hydra-headed organization of the CEF in England. The strengths and lessons that served him well on the frontier were of less value in the larger-scale and more constrained environment of the CEF in England. Canadian Corps and British offi cers made repeated and vociferous complaints about the quantity and quality of replacements produced by Steele's command. Unlike the Canadian Corps that progressively improved, the CEF's administration in England did not. Steele played a role in this chaos, and this will be analyzed here.
This article will examine this dichotomy in results between Steele's accomplishments on the frontier and his far more modest performance when operating in the metropole. It begins with a brief description of Steele and his career to 1898; then discusses his time in the Yukon, the reasons for his success, and his post-Yukon military career; and then will position him in the anarchic administrative situation of the CEF. It will highlight how weak Canadian leadership in England contributed to an ineff ective and ineffi cient organization with deleterious eff ects on the forces in the fi eld. The article will show how Steele, a product of the frontier, was miscast as a commander of training formations in the heartland in a war he did not understand.
While there are many popular biographies of Steele, and he often appears in monographs, there is no full scholarly biography, despite his prominence and importance. 4 Rod Macleod's entry in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography is the most balanced, albeit necessarily short, account of his life. 5 Robert Stewart's Lion of the Frontier is the most detailed and researched biography, but relies heavily and uncritically on Steele's own writing. The other popular biographies are based on secondary sources and are not analytical. 6 All of these biographies are focused on his Mounted Police career, as to be expected, and give only cursory att ention to his military period as a coda to his more important earlier endeavours. Further, not having delved into the CEF archives for documents beyond those writt en by Steele, biographers such as Robert Stewart unquestionably accept his perspective. For instance, Steele falsely claimed to have instituted the policy of sending reinforcements to batt alions based on regions. 7 As a result, the bare facts of his military career are presented uncritically or with a sense that the Canadian authorities treated him unfairly. Steele's autobiography, Forty Years in Canada, ends before the start of the First World War and like all such works has to be carefully interpreted for what it does and does not say. 8 Steele was sensitive about his reputation and wanted to shape it to his liking. 9 A more in-depth examination of this period provides a new and more balanced perspective on this aspect of Steele's career.
Description
Steele was tall, muscular, handsome, and rugged, and he thrived in the frontier conditions of the Canadian West and North. As his biographer expressed it, he "was everyone an idealistic old-fashioned Canadian would want to be ...." Steele was a man shaped and conditioned by the frontier just as he shaped it, and the eff ects continue to this day in the West. 10 He had prodigious stamina, dedication, and appetite for work. He was a strong leader and he did not brook with outside criticism of his troops, which endeared him to them-this sensitivity to external reproofs would later be an issue for him in the First World War. 11 A strict disciplinarian tempered with a shrewd understanding of those he commanded, Steele did not descend into being a martinet. There were lines not to be crossed and, as one of his constables put it, he "was feared and respected by men who as a usual thing feared neither God or man." 12 The personifi cation of the bluff and independent straight shooter, Steele was also a careful planner and administrator and determined to learn as much as he could about potential assignments. Contrary to the popular narrative, he was a political operator but was not particularly eff ective (to be discussed below). 13 Like almost all who reach the highest levels in any hierarchical organization, he leveraged his contacts, nurtured ties to his patrons, and was unafraid to pull any and all strings. Steele was careful to cultivate his relationship with Sam Hughes, the minister of militia, who had a notorious aversion to offi cers of the Permanent Force (PF)-Canada's regular army-when Steele was a member of the PF. He also relied on the powerful Western Canadian minister Robert Rogers to further his ends during the First World War, as att ested to by the many diary entries, cables, and lett ers referencing Rogers. 14 Steele was pragmatic on policing, as he recognized the diff erence between illegalities that had to be stopped and those that could not. He rigorously applied the former while controlling the latt er through fi nes and licences. 15 Steele and the Mounted Police maintained order with the tacit acceptance of the policed, as the NWMP did not have the resources to impose unacceptable rules and mores. He certainly imposed illegal orders, but they aligned with what the majority of the population thought reasonable.
On the negative side, Steele was prone to drinking spells when away from his wife. 16 This may have impacted his career trajectory since the head of the South African Constabulary considered him a suitable replacement except for his binges. 17 Refl ecting the prevalent racial views of his class and time, he respected some Indigenous people and leaders, but he was unavailingly negative about people of Black African descent in South Africa and Canada.
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Early Career
Characteristically, Steele's determination to fashion his reputation meant he provided several dates for his birth ranging from 1848 to 1852 depending on the situation. 19 The best evidence indicates Steele was born in Mediate Township, Ontario, on 5 January 1848, to a retired British Navy captain. Raised by his father and later his half-brother-thirty years his senior-to be a Victorian gentleman from the gentry class in the rustic backwaters of Upper Canada, Steele rapidly became a consummate horseman and shot. In 1866, he served in the Canadian Militia in the struggle against the Fenians. Military life appealed to him, and he left his career as a store clerk in rural Ontario to join the Red River Expedition of 1870. 20 The gruelling physical eff ort, ever present danger, and strenuous struggles with the climate and terrain whett ed his appetite for a military career. 21 While in the garrison at Fort Garry, Steele demonstrated his foresight by querying everyone with experience about the Prairies, in case he was to serve there. 22 After his discharge, he enlisted in the Permanent Force in Kingston. Wanting a more adventurous life, he signed up with the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) when it formed in 1873 and was among the fi rst group rushed to Fort Garry in the autumn of that year. The government established the NWMP ostensibly in response to the massacre of Indigenous people by American traders. Its actual purpose was multifold, including protection against the depredations of whiskey traders, assertion of Canadian sovereignty and control over the Canadian West, and, as Rod Macleod states, to act as "Agents of the National Policy"-Steele would be involved with all these aspects. 23 Steele operated throughout his NWMP career in the Canadian borderlands that were a transition zone between the Canadian heartland, the United States, and the realm of the Indigenous peoples. 24 The senior NWMP command recognized his leadership strengths, and he rose quickly through the ranks. They treated Steele as a troubleshooter and deployed him to the most challenging assignments where he led or participated in almost all the major developments in the prairie frontier's transformation. These included the negotiations with Chief Sitt ing Bull (Tȟatȟáŋka Íyotȟake) in 1877, the signing of treaties with the Plains Indigenous peoples, and the driving of the last spike at Craigellachie in 1885. He was instrumental in policing the construction of the transcontinental Canadian Pacifi c Railway (CPR) by acting both as a police offi cer and magistrate. His powerful personality and innate good sense dampened down many volatile situations and ensured the line moved forward. Unlike most of the other senior Mounted Police offi cers, he emerged from the North-West Rebellion in 1885 with a burnished reputation in aggressively leading a small force of scouts. 25 In 1887 the authorities sent Steele to the interior of British Columbia to prevent violence between the local Whites and the Ktunaxa (Kootenay) people. By the later summer of 1888, Steele, once again with his customary fi rmness and fairness, had defused the situation and returned to Alberta. 26 He now commanded the largest division in the NWMP at Fort Macleod in Southern Alberta. It was then he married Marie Harwood, the daughter of a wealthy and well-connected Quebec member of parliament. Steele would try to leverage this family connection to advance his career, but to seemingly litt le result. The NWMP, like the military and civil service of the period, was subject to considerable patronage and political infl uence such that the authorities considered more than just performance in promotions and assignments. 27 Not receiving the assistant commissioner's position in 1892 angered Steele. 28 He had some justifi cation for his disappointment as his record was superb, but this suggests that while he played the political game, he was not that skilled and possibly had clashed too often with party interests.
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Yukon Career
In January 1898 Steele received orders to reinforce police control in the Yukon during the stampede of thousands of gold-mad southerners to the North-of which many were foreigners of all "ilks" and "dispositions." The government was concerned that an anarchic situation would presage a loss of actual control over the territory and that had to be prevented. The government in Ott awa treated the Yukon as a colony of central Canada and was not democratic owing to the government's distrust of a populace with a minority of Canadians and of seemingly dubious character. 30 Steele received substantial reinforcements to ensure he had the resources to impose order. Specifi cally, the NWMP were to establish border posts at all the major entry posts into the Yukon at the Chilkoot and White passes as well as at the Yukon River, to collect customs duties, and to police the gold fi elds and towns. Initially, Steele moved to Skagway, Alaska, the gateway through the passes to Dawson City, to mobilize logistics and make preparations. The mayhem and unfett ered villainy of crime boss "Soapy" Smith and his gang, with their dishonest gambling, alcohol, graft, violence, and multiple methods of fl eecing the unwary, was a powerful illustration of the risk of losing control-Steele called it "litt le bett er than hell upon earth." 31 He then crossed over the Chilkoot Pass to inspect the border post in what must have been one of the most arduous stations ever staff ed by the Mounted Police. 32 Steele over-wintered at Lake Bennett , at the headwaters of the Yukon River, where thousands of the Klondikers anxiously awaited the ice breakup to race downriver to the gold fi elds. There, he worked long hours arbitrating disagreements and creating order out of what could have degenerated into bedlam. It was during the resulting rush downriver that Steele made a characteristic decision to mandate the use of guides through a particularly dangerous set of rapids. 33 He did not have the authority to enforce this rule, but characteristically he was obeyed. In Dawson City, he dominated the situation. Steele seemed to never sleep and was constantly in action over the course of his nineteenhour day acting as a magistrate, Indian Agent, and health offi cer-creating and enforcing regulations, sitt ing on the territorial council, fulfi lling the myriad civil service functions assigned to the police, checking on prisoners, confronting evil-doers, writing reports, and leading his men. 34 Despite the ample opportunity for graft and corruption, there was no evidence that Steele or any of his mounted police crossed the line, which was a testament to Steele's leadership and fi rm control. 35 Steele's command was semi-independent as he reported not to the NWMP commissioner but to the territorial commissioner and Minister of the Interior Cliff ord Sifton. 36 With communications in the winter taking weeks or months to pass between Dawson City and Ott awa, Steele had to make his own decisions and implement his own policies. This suited him ideally, and he took full advantage to achieve the objectives of peace and order. The vast majority of miners and others had no interest in the wickedness of the United States side of the border, so acquiesced with Steele's, and Canadian, laws and regulations. At times, Steele imposed arbitrary rules or adopted policies, like expelling criminals from the territory, that were illegal, but the majority of the populace understood and accepted them. Further, Steele appreciated the diff erence between what he could prohibit and what he could only regulate. The Mounted Police did not tolerate serious crimes like murder or theft, and they tirelessly tracked down these perpetrators. Steele and his policemen created an environment surprisingly free from major crimes given the rootless nature of the population. Trying to stop prostitution, gambling, or alcohol was a fruitless task in the gold rush, but prudent regulations could mitigate the most deleterious eff ects on peace and good order. As William Morrison phrased it, "the substitution of police common sense for orthodox legal knowledge and procedure was to become an important aspect of law enforcement in the Yukon." 37 There were still ample opportunities for vice and sin, but Sam Steele and the NWMP moderated and regulated them.
Steele remained in charge of the police in the Yukon and British Columbia until 20 September 1899 when he was superseded-because he struggled against the corruption of the local offi cials-to the outrage of the vast majority of the populace. 38 All three local newspapers that normally were at bitt er loggerheads were in accord in their denunciations of the move. Despite rallies and multiple telegraph messages appealing the decision, the government remained unmoved.
The situation called for initiative, independent decision making, and direct action, all of which were his particular strengths. The problems he faced in the Yukon were similar to those he had dealt with successfully for twentyfi ve years, so he had a repertoire of proven techniques to accomplish his goals. His epic legend was a powerful aid and even if the majority of the inhabitants were not Canadians, the newcomers would quickly learn of his exploits. Allied with his reputation was his outsized presence and charisma that were a potent inducement to obey the law. Finally, his pragmatic policies, even if at times illegal, never violated the core values of the community and were accepted, albeit grudgingly at times.
Military Career
Steele was at a crossroads with the ending of his Yukon mission, as he had no other major assignment and the size and continued existence of the NWMP was in question. 41 Fortuitously for him, confl ict broke out between the Boers in South Africa and the British in what became the Second AngloBoer War, and he immediately volunteered for service in the Canadian 2nd Contingent. The "imagined community of British people" culturally conditioned Steele, like many of those who volunteered, to regard the Empire's call to duty as their own. 42 He was to be the second-in-command of a mounted rifl e regiment to be drawn from the ranks of the NWMP, but he loyally stepped aside when the NWMP Commissioner Laurence Herchmer decided to lead the regiment. 43 Instead, Donald Smith, Lord Strathcona, the wealthy fi nancier, railway magnate, and now Canada's high commissioner in London, off ered the British a regiment of Western Canadian scouts paid for by him. He selected Steele to command the unit, named Lord Strathcona's Horse (LSH), and Steele, with his customary energy and care, quickly recruited the regiment. 44 Steele's carefully nurtured Canadian image for the unit helped develop a unique identity for the unit and himself. 45 The regiment arrived as the war shifted from fi xed engagements to a guerrilla war characterized by sudden blows by mobile Boer commandos pursued by ponderous British columns. Steele's personal leadership style, of being where the action was the hott est, was instrumental in developing high morale and combat eff ectiveness in a campaign marked by the frustrations of fl eeting engagements, few tangible successes, and ever-present danger. 46 Steele lost respect for the hesitant and ineff ective British leadership, as well as the orders to burn farms and collect women and children to take to camps. 47 Steele's period in command, however, was not without its controversy. While Steele was away, the regiment, believing its war was over, celebrated so much that the British called out several companies to bring back order. It appears the British commanders chalked the incident up to the expected behaviour of wild colonials. 48 An offi cer in the LSH, the wealthy Agar Adams, while initially impressed with Steele, accused him of being a bully and "treating the men like animals." 49 He also claimed Steele and his offi cers got "beastly drunk" and left the men to their own devices. Macleod, in his Dictionary of Canadian Biography entry on Steele, argues persuasively that Adamson's complaints were at least exaggerated, for one enduring characteristic of Steele was his care for his men. The other incident was more serious and involved a war crime where LSH troops assisted in hanging six Boers after men from another regiment suff ered casualties when fi red upon under a fl ag of truce. Carmen Miller believes the case was covered up, but there was no suggestion that Steele was directly involved in the war crime.
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The LSH returned to Canada in 1901 after a successful tour in England where the British government, newspapers, and people feted them. Before leaving South Africa, Lord Baden-Powell, of later Boy Scouts fame, off ered Steele a divisional command of a thousand constables in the new South African Constabulary (SAC)-a force similar in form and purpose to the original NWMP. As the government was not yet ready to convert the LSH into a permanent Canadian military unit, Steele accepted the off er as he did not intend to return to the NWMP. 51 His experience on the prairies, and Baden-Powell's confi dence in Steele, meant that Steele helped shape the SAC. Baden-Powell thought him a potential successor to command, which was a considerable mark of esteem for a colonial offi cer. 52 Steele served for fi ve somewhat frustrating years with the SAC, since the authorities spread the Canadians he recruited for the force across all the divisions rather than concentrated under his command. 53 In 1906, he left the SAC to serve a further eight months in England as a staff offi cer to Baden-Powell, who was then the Inspector of Cavalry. 54 In 1907 Steele returned to Canada to join the PF with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The Canadian military comprised the tiny PF of regulars and a nominally 70,000-man non-permanent active militia in 1914-hereafter referred to as the Militia. The PF was responsible for training the Militia, but there was considerable friction between the two forces because of competition over limited funding. 55 High personnel turnover and restricted opportunities for its own training hampered the PF. 56 However, under the reforming Liberal Minister of Militia and Defence Frederick Borden, a cousin of the later Conservative prime minister Robert Borden, the Canadian military underwent a considerable transformation in organization, budget, and the ability to fi eld complete units. 57 The annual budget for the military increased from $3 million in 1904 to $13 million in 1914, and the size of the Permanent Force grew from 900 to 3,100 in 1914. 58 Steele
nd Division
Steele continued in his command of Military District #10 through the early part of the war, with his district raising two batt alions each for the 1st and 2nd Divisions. 60 In February 1915 Sam Hughes appointed Steele to command the 2nd Division, which the British had accepted after a Canadian off er for a second contingent on 31 October 1914. 61 Instead of mobilizing centrally, as did the 1st Division, the authorities formed and stationed the 2nd Division's units locally where they trained over the winter. 62 Choosing Steele to command the 2nd Division was a convoluted process. The British selection of the former British cabinet minister J.E.B. Seely, without consultation, to command the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, goaded the Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden to ensure that a Canadian commanded the 2nd Division. 63 Borden dissuaded Hughes from taking the command, and instead Hughes recommended Steele for the post for his proven organizational skills. 64 Steele's selection also had the merit of his considerable prestige, and satisfying the demands of powerful cabinet minister Robert Rogers for equal representation for Western Canada in the command ranks-eastern offi cers commanded two of the three brigades in the 1st Division. 65 When Hughes proposed Steele to Lord Kitchener, the British secretary of state for war, Kitchener rejected Steele on account of his age (sixty-six) and lack of staff training. He knew him from his service in the Boer War when Kitchener commanded the British army in South Africa. Despite the suggestion that his age was an unwarranted objection, Steele ostensibly at sixty-six years old was eleven years older than the average British division commander and twenty-two years older than the average Canadian one in 1915. 66 Further, there were questions about Steele's health, with the offi cial Canadian Medical History claiming he was suff ering from an incurable malady. 67 Hughes, later in 1916, thought Steele was on his last legs. 68 Kitchener was correct to reject Steele for duty in France. Hughes and the British authorities eventually agreed that Steele could bring the division to England but not take it to France, and would receive a position commensurate with his prominence. As Steele was a commissioned offi cer in the British Army as a result of his command of LSH, Kitchener assigned him the Southeastern District in England. This was a training command that included Shorncliff e, the major Canadian instruction centre. 69 Hughes also made him the GOC-Canadians despite there already being a GOC-Canadians appointed in February 1915-Brigadier-General J.C. MacDougall, another PF offi cer-an oversight that would generate much heat between the two men. 70 Losing the division was understandably a deep disappointment to Steele as he believed himself fully capable of commanding in action. 71 According to his former aide-de-camp, Steele was popular with many offi cers and men in the division, but the new commander-Major-General Richard Turner with a Victoria Cross and combat experience on the Western Front-quickly won them over. 72 Not everyone thought Steele competent; Harold McGill, the medical offi cer of the 31st Batt alion, wrote that when Turner took over the division, "there was a feeling of profound relief, among many of us at least." 73 Another commented that the division's British chief staff offi cer spoke for himself and not Steele, which was against staff practice, but under Turner he was careful to follow this policy. British staff offi cers were always supposed to be a representative of the commander and never speak for themselves on offi cial matt ers. This suggests a lack of respect for Steele. 74 In training, Steele had his units conduct training exercises as meeting engagements, an approach characterized by a leading military historian as more appropriate for the Franco-Prussian War and something rarely if ever encountered on the Western Front. 75 While in command, Steele, however, took a positive step in weeding out unqualifi ed offi cers selected by Sam Hughes, including two brigadier-generals and a batt alion commander.
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First World War Context
The scale, scope, and nature of the First World War were unprecedented challenges for Canada, as it vastly increased its army from one PF regiment to fi fty active service batt alions by the end of the war. 77 The factors of distance, lack of experience in raising and maintaining overseas forces, having to report to both British and Canadian authorities, and the rapidly evolving nature of the war, magnifi ed the problem. The scale of the losses in the First World War was immense and necessitated the Canadian authorities to improvise a massive recruiting and training infrastructure in Canada and England. 78 Inevitably, mistakes were made, but the tragedy was Canada's retention of the faulty system and incompetent commanders until late 1916. The war placed unprecedented demands on the Canadian military, so it was not surprising that there were initial failures. These errors were understandable, but after two years, however, the Canadian system in England was not improving and inexperience was no longer an excuse. The administration was not addressing the problems of ineffi ciency, ineff ectiveness, and promotion inequities. This was in stark contrast to the increasing professionalism and eff ectiveness of the Canadian forces at the front. If the fi eld forces could master a steep learning curve, so should have the Canadian administration in England.
Canadian training units in England were under the operational, administrative, disciplinary, logistical, and, until late 1916, instructional control by various area commands, such as Eastern Command to which Steele reported. The result was that Canadian forces followed British regulations in most matt ers. Steele's position was a diffi cult one as he had two diff erent sets of superiors who had diff erent agendas and demands. As an offi cer of the British Army in command of a district, he reported to the general in charge of the Eastern Command of British Home Forces and had to follow British rules and regulations. He was also a Canadian offi cer with a Canadian Training Division (CTD) in his district and was nominally the general commanding all Canadian forces in England.
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He therefore also reported to Sam Hughes, who had control over his professional career and who had a well-known dislike of PF offi cers. 80 As a result, Steele would not confront Hughes over the myriad problems in the system and could not circumvent the rules and regulations like in the Yukon.
The structure of Canadian forces in England was a confusing mess of feuding offi cers, civilians, and ministerial representatives. At one point in 1916, six separate authorities in England claimed to speak for Canada. They included the acting high commissioner Sir George Perley; Max Aitken, Hughes's personal representative; Lord Brooke and later David Watson, the commanders of the Bramshott CTD; Major-General J.C. MacDougall, the original GOC-Canadians in charge of the Shorncliff e CTD; MajorGeneral John Wallace Carson, Hughes's "Special Representative"; and Steele, the GOC Southeastern District, and another GOC-Canadians. This naturally confused the War Offi ce, which at one point plaintively asked who was in charge. 81 The answer, ultimately, was-Sam Hughes, who used this ambiguous command structure to ensure he made all the important decisions. This contributed to the poor coordination and jostling for Hughes's att ention between the diff erent parties and their subordinates. For instance, Steele wrote to John Carson on behalf of senior offi cers at Shorncliff e who were eager to meet Hughes on his visit to England in July 1916 as they feared that "he is not in possession of true facts relative to them and their work." 82 This confusing structure developed rapidly once the 1st Division left for France in February 1915. As new units arrived, the authorities added more training areas that would report to diff erent British commands. By late 1916, the Canadian organization consisted of fi fty-seven reserve batt alions scatt ered across six major centres, split into two training divisions at Shorncliff e and Bramshott , each reporting to a separate British command. Carson, a stout mining-stock promoter, adroitly manoeuvred a poorly defi ned set of responsibilities into a position of being the de facto authority for the feuding Canadian major-generals in the training commands and the British. Carson impressed Borden in his initial foray as a special representative in 1914, and Borden extended Carson's mandate to be the communications nexus between the British, the Canadian authorities in France and England, and Hughes. Carson entirely depended on Hughes's favour and so was certain to satisfy him even when he disagreed with the minister's demands. 83 Carson told another senior offi cer that he "was obliged to do things, by order of the Minster, of which he did not approve." 84 Other offi cers ignoring his nominal position as GOC-Canadians was intensely frustrating to Steele. 85 For instance, the querulous Steele blasted Carson for bypassing him regarding requests for recommendations on rewards to his subordinates, "I contend that I must not be passed over and ignored in the way I have been." 86 In early 1916, Steele complained to Hughes that Carson does not seem to understand his status and that Carson's meddling "is a scandal." 87 
Problems with Canadian Administration
Every facet of the Canadian military administration in 1915 and 1916 was defective, from the quartermaster branch to the chaplain service to, most importantly, the training of the combat arms and offi cers. This failure had drastic, deleterious consequences, as it seriously compromised the Canadian Corps' ability to sustain its edge. Offi cers at the front complained, the British complained, and even Borden complained about the disorganization and misrule. From early in the confl ict, there was constant criticism of the administration. An example was a complaint sent by a 5 th Brigade offi cer to Borden that: "Canadian soldiering arrangements in England are in a deplorable state." 88 His was not the only lett er, and the fi les show much discontent and anger. A report on the training system included this damning critique: "the conception and tone of the Canadian Training Division is on a wrong basis from its foundation." 89 The commander of the Canadian Corps complained to Hughes in February 1916 that there is "a strong and growing conviction, among all my Divisional, Brigade and Batt alion Commanders, that the best possible is not being done, as regards these drafts." 90 The commander of the British Expeditionary Force, General Sir Douglas Haig, after discussions with the new Canadian Corps commander, Sir Julian Byng, in June 1916, wrote, "his recent drafts have been badly trained, and he told me that the Canadian organisation at Shorncliff e is a disgrace." 91 In December 1915 Major-General Arthur Currie complained that the artillery instruction was "d-d rott en and the men responsible for the training of these men should be told so in no unmistakable terms." 92 The training of replacements for the combat arms was the responsibility of the CTD at Shorncliff e, which reported to Steele. The complaints about the offi cers and men sent to the front regarded the numbers provided and the eff ectiveness of their instruction. The training system had great diffi culty in providing suffi cient replacements when the corps suff ered heavy losses. The fi rst major engagement of multiple divisions of the Canadian Corps at the Batt le of Mount Sorrel in June 1916 resulted in 8,000 casualties. 93 The training system was unprepared for this scale of losses, and the authorities had to strip the 4th Division that was forming in England and scheduled to cross to France in July. For instance, the 46th Batt alion lost 80% of its personnel in June. 94 As a result, just as the division was in its fi nal preparations, it had to start training recruits all over. The 24,000 casualties on the Somme threw an insupportable burden on the training establishment, and it collapsed. By 8 November, the corps was short 296 offi cers, with only sixty-fi ve replacements ready. The infantry needed 9,368 drafts, but only 2,923 partially trained replacements were available, leaving a shortfall of 6,445 men. 95 This at a time when there were over 78,000 men in England in training, administration, or acting as instructors.
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Not only were there too few men, those arriving were unprepared for batt le. The Canadian syllabus was a scant ten weeks, which was insuffi cient time to instruct the recruits properly--the British War Offi ce course was fourteen weeks. 97 In most instances, recruits did not complete their full instruction period; 59.2% of all the replacements provided in 1916 were only partially trained, and during the Somme in October 1916, the proportion rose to a shockingly high seven out of ten men not fully trained as the Shorncliff e CTD rushed men to the front to replace losses. 98 Even the limited preparation was often on outmoded principles and obsolete manuals. 99 In one remarkable example of how out of touch the training personnel were, a staff offi cer at Shorncliff e stated in the fall of 1916 that the "Lewis machine gun is apparently being used in the Canadian Corps"-this a year after its introduction at the front. 100 The quantity and quality of replacement offi cers was another problem. 101 In early 1916, Shorncliff e had only 7% of its offi cers immediately available for drafts and another 8% after completing courses. 102 The corps complained that offi cers arriving from England did not have suffi cient practical training to be eff ective to the extent that the corps established a school for them. 103 Steele had to issue an order that all offi cers were to know their men-it was extraordinary that they were unaware of this most basic of responsibilities. 104 These failures had disastrous repercussions on the batt lefi eld during the Somme. For example, the shortage of replacements meant the 5th Brigade went into batt le on 1 October 1916 with slightly more than half of its normal trench strength, with the result the Germans defeated its att ack. 105 The 1st and 3rd Divisions att acked on 8 October with batt alions with an average strength of 400 to 500 men, roughly two-thirds of what they should have had. 106 Another factor in the defeat was that the newly arrived replacements from England had not fi red the rifl e employed, nor had experience with grenades used at the front.
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Steele's Culpability
To what extent was Steele responsible or culpable for this lamentable situation? He was by no means the main culprit or factor in the chaosSam Hughes was the primary off ender-but he bears responsibility. Steele did att empt to address some of the issues as his diary att ests. He regularly chided MacDougall and staff over their poor performance. There are regular references to his orders to the CTD for closer supervision, for surprise inspections, and for other improvements. 108 He recognized that not all was well with it, as "I feel very much dissatisfi ed with the state of aff airs in the Canadian division." 109 He also claimed he was not permitt ed to interfere with the Shorncliff e CTD, which was a curious assertion as it was under his command. 110 However, Steele's eff orts were unavailing and the abysmal conditions were not eff ectively addressed.
Part of the issue was Steele's refusal to accept reproof from the front on the quantity and quality of replacements. 111 This att itude was intensely frustrating and led to comments from senior offi cers like Arthur Currie, then commanding the 1st Division: "I almost feel as if it is no further use making complaints, because the position is almost hopeless." 112 The situation was so bad that the commander-in-chief of the home forces in England stated his satisfaction that the new Canadian administration brought in December 1916 was willing to accept criticisms unlike the previous regime.
113 As a result of this sensitivity to criticism, Steele did not take suffi cient steps to reform what he controlled. Conditioning Steele's response to the complaints was his contempt for Militia offi cers. There are references in his diary disparaging them, such as "some of these militia seem to feel that they know it all" and "pett y shopkeepers in charge." 114 During the Somme campaign, 81% of the senior combat commanders in the Canadian Corps were Militia offi cers with only 14% being from the PF. 115 This cohort of offi cers built the Canadian Corps with 83% still serving at the great victory at Vimy Ridge. 116 Steele underestimated the Militia contribution and how the unique conditions of the Western Front diff ered from his own experiences in South Africa.
Steele also, according to the available fi les, lett ers, and diary entries, did not confront Hughes about the problems in the system other than send some suggestions for improvements, although he thought Hughes a fraud as a soldier. 117 Desmond Morton wrote that Hughes had terrorized the PF offi cers like MacDougall and Steele so they would not question the minister. 118 He well knew Hughes's reaction to an adverse report and counselled the British authorities that it would result in "the offi cers who made it being dismissed from the Canadian service for their temerity." 119 Further, when meeting with Hughes, Steele would bolster Hughes's prejudices and opinions. For instance, in a 22 March 1916 diary entry, Steele wrote that when asked by Hughes about the Ross Rifl e, much despised by the troops in the fi eld, "I said the men who had the Ross would not exchange it for the Lee Enfi eld." 120 By October 1916 Borden could no longer ignore the chaotic situation in England, and he made major changes. In November, he secured Hughes's resignation and split the Ministry of Militia into two separate ministries, with one for Canada and one overseas. The acting high commissioner, Sir George Perley, headed the new overseas ministry, and he selected the commander of the 2nd Division, Major-General Richard Turner, to command the Canadians in England. Turner and his staff implemented wide-sweeping reforms that increased the eff ectiveness of the training organization, improved its effi ciency, and refashioned the promotion system. What was remarkable was how swiftly these changes took eff ect. 121 This suggests the problems with the previous regime were not inherent, but ones stemming from weak commanders and administrative structure.
Recognizing that the changing of the guard represented both an opportunity and a threat, in November 1916 Steele sent Perley a long lett er recommending how to organize the new ministry and who should be in charge. He was confi dent about his abilities and suggested Perley should appoint him the ministry's inspector general or, even bett er, the commanding offi cer as he was especially suited to that role. 122 Steele was thoroughly convinced he was both greatly respected by the offi cers and men of the CEF and that they wanted him in command; Steele wrote in his diary in regards to a rumour of a new corps commander, with the previous one taking command in Canada, that "This is an outrage … one or the other [commands] is my right." 123 It is far more likely that their esteem was for his accomplishments dating back to his service with the NWMP and the LSH than for his performance in the First World War. He found subordination to Turner, who was a more junior Militia offi cer and had "taken his division," "very annoying." 124 Wanted neither by Perley nor Turner, they removed Steele from his Canadian command, but he retained the British Southeastern District until 1918. 125 Likely his dismissal was a result of being seen as too closely aligned with the old regime, his age, the poor results of his command, and his constant back-channel stringpulling. He got into particularly hot water in June 1917 when he wired Robert Rogers advocating for the promotion of his protégé BrigadierGeneral HDB Ketchen to lead a division-Ketchen had served under Steele in the NWMP, LSH, and in MD#10. Perley suggested to Borden that it was time for Steele to return to Canada. 126 Steele, however, remained in England, but retired in July 1918 and died from infl uenza in January 1919.
Why was Steele so much less successful in England than during his period in the Yukon? This time, the factors of scale, problem, location, and personal considerations all negatively aff ected his performance. In command of the Southeastern District, Steele operated at an entirely diff erent scale than in the Yukon, which included several times more men than there were people in the Yukon in 1899. He was responsible for approximately 250 mounted police in the Yukon and British Columbia force, while the Shorncliff e CTD had a strength of over 40,000 men. Further, in England he was four stages removed from the training and only dealt directly with it on inspections. 127 His information and his decisions had to pass through several levels of delegation, which required a diff erent skill set than dealing directly with problems. In England, he faced a new set of challenges for which he had litt le to no relevant experience. His active military service was always as a mounted rifl e offi cer and so he had litt le exposure to the infantry or technical arms, such as the artillery or engineers, outside of his period in charge of the military districts. He had limited knowledge of the conditions of the front, in part because he could not visit the Canadian Corps and did not appreciate the changing nature of the war as a result. The situation on the Western Front was unique and in constant change such that the Canadian Corps later in the war would not accept an offi cer who had been away from the front for more than six months. 128 Even the senior British general Sir William Robertson lamented "each war has its own peculiarities, but one would think that no war was ever so peculiar as the present one, and Field Service Regulations will require a tremendous amount of revising..." 129 Steele's refusal to accept criticism and his dismissal of Militia offi cers meant he did not appreciate the extent of the failure in training. Rather than viewing his organization as a servant of the fi ghting troops, he regarded it as a co-equal and above reproach.
No longer on the frontier, he was now at the heart of the Empire and integrated into a chain of command with virtually instant communications with many masters and agendas. He now had to satisfy diff erent and sometimes confl icting demands, something he had litt le experience with. Rigid British rules and regulations as well as the changing Canadian situation constrained his options, and so he did not have the freedom to improvise. Further, he was limited in his authority without referring to his superiors for approval, which seems to have sapped his initiative. Despite his elevated rank in England, he was just a cog in a larger machine rather than the key fi gure as he was in the Yukon.
In 1898-1899, he was in the prime of life and had the benefi t of twentyfi ve years of relevant experience in police matt ers. By the time of the First World War, he was seventeen years older, more corpulent, and while he still worked hard, the fi re was absent. Infi ghting and trying to get the other major-generals, who were behaving badly, to obey him absorbed too much of his energy. That they did not comply despite his nominal title of GOC-Canadians indicates the extent to which his power had eroded. Having to continually claim to be in charge, but being ignored, means you are not in charge. Further, matching a patt ern from earlier in his life, his att empts to bring political infl uence to bear and to work back channels were to no avail. Even Steele lost confi dence in the cabinet minister Robert Rogers's ability to accomplish much for him, and his choice of political patrons in Rogers and Hughes was unwise. 130 Further, he badly misjudged his standing with the authorities outside of the Hughes and Rogers cliques, and Perley and Turner stripped him of his Canadian command. While still admired for his accomplishments as a mounted policeman, his more recent military achievements were too modest to justify continued responsibilities.
Conclusion
This article demonstrates how one of the great fi gures in the early days of the Yukon fl oundered under the strains of total war. In the Yukon, Steele's natural decisiveness and independence received free rein, where he did not have to defer and get approval from multiple authorities for decisions, and where the scale of his responsibility was such that he could directly interact with all involved. In those conditions, Steele thrived. He was a leader made by the frontier and performed best in that environment, and his real accomplishments there should not be sullied by his less successful career during the First World War. In England, now in the centre and far from the frontier, the att ributes, character, and experience that served him so well did not translate. Steele was not the primary culprit or cause of the chaos in the administration in England, but neither was he blameless or innocent of contributing to it. In eff ect, the Lion of the Frontier became the Lion in Winter.
